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1 Executive Summary 
GB is driving towards a zero-carbon grid that translates to a power system that is tending towards lower inertia, with 
synchronous generators being displaced by non-synchronous generators. The inherent benefits that synchronous 
generators provide the power system, particularly in terms of frequency and voltage stability, are also being displaced 
as a result. This report presents the details of an assessment concerning future frequency response services in a zero-
carbon GB power system in 2025. In particular, existing and proposed future frequency responses are compared and 
tested in a range of scenarios to investigate the impact to both frequency behaviour and the maximum amount of non-
synchronous power that can be dispatched at a given time. Regarding the provision of future frequency response services 
by 2025, potential providers and upgrades are also considered. 
1.1 Key Findings 
• Existing services are adequate for containing events that result in a 0.125 Hz/s RoCoF but they are inadequate 
for normal loss risk frequency conditions at 0.5 Hz/s and all loss risk frequency conditions at 1 Hz/s. The 
ESO’s proposed frequency response products, as they are defined, are adequate for both 0.125 Hz/s and 0.5 
Hz/s, but inadequate for normal loss risk frequency conditions at 1 Hz/s; at this low inertia there is also an 
increased risk of frequency instabilities that depends on the specific control design deployed and how much 
faster the service activates compared to the delay defined in the requirements.  
• Thresholds of 79 GVAs and 60 GVAs were identified as a boundary beyond which the risk of instability 
increases for containing 1.32 GW and 1 GW normal loss risks. Inertia data from the ESO suggests that this 
boundary occurs up to about 1% of the year in 2025, but in a 44% average penetration of non-synchronous 
generation in 2030 the boundary can occur up to 22% of the year. This risk can be remedied by introducing a 
definition for a service that activates within 250 ms of the event, such as the Improved Frequency Containment 
service demonstrated.  
• The Improved Frequency Containment service can be deployed in tandem with the ESO’s proposed services, 
and can tolerate deactivation after the initial response period; however, it is shown that in some instances this 
would require an additional secondary service to keep frequency within acceptable limits. Other fast-acting 
services like synthetic inertia can also provide benefits to containment, but the service definitions will need to 
include limitations to any recovery period. 
• The system non-synchronous penetration limit is mostly limited by the RoCoF limit, however, once the 
changes to the setting take place (expected by 2022) there is minimal impact to the SNSP trends when 
comparing existing and proposed frequency response services. This is primarily due to the limiting constraint 
of baseload power supply from nuclear power plants.  
• It is likely that synchronous generators will continue to participate in the frequency response market after the 
ESO replaces existing services with the proposed services, with the most likely product being Dynamic 
Regulation. Non-synchronous technologies are uniquely suited to fast response services such as Dynamic 
Moderation and Dynamic Containment, but the inclusion of storage can improve the certainty of power 
availability and compliance with service definitions, while also offering a route to surpass limitations if VSM 
is also deployed.  
1.2 Recommendations 
• In light of the upcoming deployment of Dynamic Containment frequency response service, with an expected 
initial reserve of 250 MW of a target 1 GW and a unit cap of 50 MW, non-synchronous providers may consider 
existing and mature control strategies that will allow compliance with service definitions. Although not 
essential for Dynamic Containment, a hybrid with energy storage offers improved power availability certainty. 
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2 Frequency Management in GB 
The Security and Quality of Supply Standard (SQSS) defines conditions such as normal and infrequent loss risks, as 
well as unacceptable frequency conditions [1]. Table 2.1 is extracted from [1] and it provides definitions for the 
aforementioned conditions.  
Table 2.1: Definition of conditions extracted from [1]. 
Normal Loss 
Risk 
That level of loss of power in-feed risk which is covered over long periods 
operationally by frequency response to avoid a deviation of system 
frequency by more than 0.5 Hz. Until 31st March 2014, this is 1000 MW. 
From April 1st 2014, this is 1320 MW, however as described in [2] the 
practical normal loss risk is still currently 1000 MW. 
Infrequent 
Loss Risk 
That level of loss of power in-feed risk which is covered over long periods 
operationally by frequency response to avoid a deviation of system 
frequency outside the range 49.5 Hz to 50.5 Hz for more than 60 seconds. 
Until 31st March 2014, this is 1320 MW. From April 1st 2014, this is 
1800 MW, however as described in [2] the practical infrequent loss risk 




These are conditions where: 
i) the steady state frequency falls outside the statutory limits of 49.5 Hz to 
50.5 Hz; or 
ii) a transient frequency deviation on the MITS persists outside the above 
statutory limits and does not recover to within 49.5 Hz to 50.5 Hz within 
60 seconds. 
Transient frequency deviations outside the limits of 49.5 Hz and 50.5 Hz 
shall only occur at intervals, which ought reasonably be considered as 
infrequent. It is not possible to be prescriptive with regard to the type of 
secured event which could lead to transient deviations since this will 
depend on the extant frequency response characteristics of the system 
which National Grid ESO shall adjust from time to time to meet the 
security and quality requirements of this Standard. 
  
The loss limits were changed because in 2011 an SQSS review of infeed losses determined that the old limits were no 
longer consistent with the range of technologies available to developers, and presented itself as a barrier to the 
connection of planned large generating plants – including new nuclear units with capacities up to 1800 MW. The decision 
was further justified by an Ofgem impact assessment associated with large nuclear plants, indicating carbon savings, 
wholesale price impact, etc., details on the review of infeed losses in GB are available in [3]. While this review was 
motivated by planned new connections of large nuclear power plants, at the time of writing, none of those planned new 
plants have been connected to the power system. The changes to the SQSS permits larger units or connection designs, 
such that a single event could cause loss event larger than those under the previous loss risk definitions. In addition to 
Hinckley C nuclear power plant, other examples include the North Sea Link 1400 MW HVDC interconnector [4] due 
to be completed in 2021, and potentially, large offshore wind farm connections. The ESO interprets its obligations 




Figure 2.1: Diagrammatic representation of energy response for a maximum loss of in-feed event [6]. Green – normal 
operating conditions, Amber – normal loss conditions, Red – infrequent loss conditions. 
Under normal operating conditions frequency can deviate from nominal 50 Hz by 0.2 Hz, a limit referred to as the 
operational limit (49.8 Hz – 50.2 Hz), however, during a loss event a larger frequency excursion can occur. A loss event 
within the definitions of a normal loss risk must be contained within the statutory limit, i.e. 49.5 Hz – 50.5 Hz, if the 
loss causes frequency to exceed this limit then frequency must take no longer than 60 seconds to recovery to within 
statutory limits. There are other thresholds that apply for larger excursions of frequency from 50 Hz, which requires 
additional actions in order to manage frequency. The Low Frequency Demand Disconnection (LFDD) threshold starts 
at 48.8 Hz1, and as the name implies, it is the disconnection of demand in order to prevent frequency collapse. The full 
spread of the LFDD thresholds as they apply to the three GB Transmission Operators (TOs), National Grid Electricity 
Transmission (NGET), Scottish Power Transmission (SPT) and Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission Plc (SHET), is 
available in [7].  
There are also conditions relating to how quickly the system frequency changes, i.e. the RoCoF. These conditions, as 
set at the time of writing, are stated in [8]. Prior to the settings in [8], the RoCoF setting was 0.125 Hz/s; however, in a 
low inertia power system a credible loss of infeed or demand event would lead to a higher RoCoF. The consequence of 
the higher RoCoF under the previous 0.125 Hz/s setting is the increased risk of unintended operation of RoCoF LoM 
protection in distributed generation [9, 10], especially at higher loss risks and/or low inertia. The unintended operation 
of these relays could lead to a cascading effect, increasing the risk of exceeding the threshold for LFDD triggers [11]. 
To reduce the risk of unintended operation of these relays, the new LoM settings were written into the Engineering 
Recommendation G59 (now superseded by G99) [8]. It is stated in [8] that on or after the 1st of August 2016, most 
generators greater than or equal to 5 MW in capacity must operate using a RoCoF relay setting of 1 Hz/s and 0.5 s delay, 
with synchronous generators commissioned before the 1st of August 2016 permitted to use a 0.5 Hz/s setting. Generators 
with registered capacity less than 5 MW that were commissioned on or after 1st of February 2018, must operate using 
a RoCoF relay setting of 1 Hz/s and 0.5 s delay, while generators commissioned before the 1st of February 2018 with a 
registered capacity less than 5 MW are permitted to use a setting no lower than the original 0.125 Hz/s and not greater 
than 1 Hz/s with a 0.5 s delay. However, Engineering Recommendation G99 specifies a 1 Hz/s setting with a 0.5 s delay 
for RoCoF based LoM protection relays. At the time of writing, there remains about 2 GW of distributed generation 
using relays that could activate if RoCoF exceeds 0.125 Hz/s [12]. However, there are plans in place to update the LoM 
protection settings by 2022 [13]. 
 
  
                                                     
1 48.8 Hz in the NGET transmission area, 48.5 Hz in SPT area and 48.6 Hz in SHET area [15]. 
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3 Frequency Response in GB 
When it comes to managing frequency and securing for credible loss events, both RoCoF limits and acceptable 
frequency conditions must be considered, and suitable actions need to be taken by the ESO in order to be compliant. 
One of such actions, is the scheduling of energy reserves held and delivered by participating providers in order to contain 
and restore a frequency excursion. At the time of writing, the ESO utilises four services described in Table 3.1 and 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Overview of Frequency Response Services [14, 15]. 




Full delivery of active power response no more than 10 seconds after the event with a 
maximum 2 second delay and sustained for a further 20 seconds. It is the dominant means 





Full delivery of active power response no more than 30 seconds after the event and 
sustained for 30 minutes. It plays a vital role in restoring frequency excursions caused by 




Full delivery of active power response no more than 10 seconds after the event with a 
maximum 2 second delay and sustained indefinitely. It is the dominant means of containing 





Full delivery of response for a 0.5 Hz change from nominal 50 Hz frequency and sustained 
for 15 minutes, with the capability to fully deliver response within 1 second. This 




Figure 3.1: Current GB frequency response services [14]. 
With the exception of EFR (a solely dynamic service), these responses can be dynamic or static. Dynamic frequency 
responses are services that continuously track frequency changes to provide a proportional response. Static frequency 
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responses are discreet responses to frequency deviations when a frequency threshold2 is exceeded. Figure 3.2 shows the 
definitions for future frequency response services proposed by the ESO in [16] and [17].  
 
 
Figure 3.2: ESO’s draft future frequency response services [16] [17]. 
According to National Grid ESO, Dynamic Containment will be the first of their proposed products that will be 
introduced, where assets will be permitted to aggregate within a single GSP. The goal is to procure 1 GW of this product 
for both low and high frequency events but are expecting an initial 250 MW, with a unit cap of 50 MW. Although this 
service cannot be stacked with existing products, the ESO aims to maximise stacking opportunities with the rest of the 
new products; however, they will not permit payment for the same MW/MWh twice [18]. 
The deadbands for Dynamic Moderation and Dynamic Containment can be used alongside historical 1 second 
frequency data from the ESO to estimate the number of deadband violations from 2014 to 2019. The results of this study 
are depicted in Figure 3.3 as yearly totals and Figure 3.4 as monthly totals. The study indicates that the power system is 
becoming increasingly volatile with more deadband (i.e. the deadbands proposed for Dynamic Moderation and Dynamic 
Containment) violations occurring in recent years than observed historically. 
                                                     
2 Based on the details presented in [20], the threshold for static Primary response in 49.6 Hz and the threshold for static Secondary response is 




Figure 3.3: Annual violations for 0.1Hz and 0.2Hz deadbands [19].  
 
 





4 Power System Model and Validation 
A simplified single bus transmission model (SBM) and a frequency studies tool (FEROS) are used in this report. The 
SBM [20], shown in Figure 4.1, is used to model of GB power system in DigSILENT PowerFactory [21], and FEROS 
is a tool that is used to operate the model and conduct system studies.  
 
Figure 4.1: Single bus model. 
The SBM neglects the spatial distribution of generators and loads, and treats them as being connected to a single 
busbar. It is an aggregation of elements in the power system based on how they respond to frequency events, allowing 
for convenient representation of operational conditions and response providers whilst maintaining a reasonably accurate 
assessment of system frequency behaviour during a loss event. The FSG (Flexible Synchronous Generator) and FNG 
(Flexible Non-synchronous Generator) elements of the model are the generation elements that provide active power 
response to a frequency imbalance via controller actions. As a synchronous machine, FSG also provides an inertial 
response to the frequency event, while FNG does not. The ISG (Inflexible Synchronous Generators) and ING (Inflexible 
Non-synchronous Generators) elements of the model are generation elements with no controller action in response to a 
frequency event, however, ISG does provide an inertial response. It should be noted that FNG and ING can also include 
interconnector imports when applicable to the scenario. Within the dispatch, an inertia constant of 6 seconds is assumed 
for all gas units and 4 seconds for all other synchronous generators. The EFR and Static Response elements represent 
their corresponding frequency services, while SC allows representation of Synchronous Compensators. The Demand 
element refers to demand on the transmission system, i.e. the power exported from the transmission network, and 
includes pumped hydro, interconnector exports and net unmetered embedded generation. The default value for the 
sensitivity of demand to frequency changes is 2.5%/Hz [14]. The Embedded Inertia element represents the inertia 
associated with synchronous machines (generators and motors) operating within the distribution network. Based on 
discussions with industry experts embedded inertia is assumed to be equivalent to an inertia constant of 1.83 seconds as 
applied to the total transmission system demand. A loss of infeed event is represented by the LoIF element and a loss of 
load event is represented by the LoL element. It should be noted that dynamic Secondary response, as defined in GB 
today, is the extended delivery of Primary response, no ‘secondary-only’ dynamic frequency response product or service 
exists. In practice, dynamic Primary and Secondary responses are delivered by the same plant; the provider delivers a 
response that meets the requirements of both services. Therefore, unless otherwise stated, the modelling methodology 
used in this report assumes no distinct dynamic Secondary response product or service.  
The SBM has been used to replicate the frequency event that occurred in Britain on the 9th of August 2019 as detailed 
in [22]. The public report of the event provides unusually complete details of the magnitude and timing of the loss 
events, the system conditions during the event and the magnitude of the frequency response that was provided by the 
GB ESO. The 9th of August event is simulated by applying these known parameters to the model alongside the 
underlying assumptions of the SBM. Although the default assumption for dynamic Primary response are its statutory 
requirements, in replicating the event, the speed of delivery of dynamic Primary response is tuned given knowledge 
from discussions with industry experts that the real-world delivery of the service usually slightly outperforms the 
statutory requirements. All other responses are modelled in line with their statutory definitions. The results of the 
simulation are compared with real 1 second frequency data from the time of the event in Figure 4.2.  It is found that the 
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comparative frequency and RoCoF traces of the simulated event are in close agreement with the real system 
measurements, which acts as a strong validation of the model’s ability to accurately replicate system frequency.  
 
Figure 4.2: Replicating the 9th of August 2019 event. 
Figure 4.3 shows how the frequency behaviour during the 9th of August 2019 event would be impacted if all the 
scheduled response, was delivered. The results indicate that if all the response scheduled to be delivered during the event 
had been delivered, the events would have been contained within the infrequent los risk frequency conditions. An 
overview of both scenarios is presented in Table 4.1. 
















230 198 480 165 





Figure 4.3: Plots comparing the scenarios from Table 4.1. 
Unless otherwise stated the subsequent studies and results presented in this report use the tuned SBM (Figure 4.2) to 
simulate the GB power system in 2025, with the following assumptions made:   
• the loss of infeed3 is simulated as a single instantaneous4 loss of power supply such that frequency is contained 
within acceptable frequency conditions as detailed in  Table 2.1; 
• demand is modelled as total demand in the power system including exports;  
• dynamic response services are simulated as defined, with 227 MW of EFR dispatched;  
• it is assumed that Primary response is delivered by gas and hydro plants in the FSG element of the model, and 
frequency is contained using the least response reserve holding as estimated by FEROS;  
• the flexible synchronous generator is modelled as 70% loaded with 30% headroom for delivery of response;  
• generation background is based on the GB ESO’s Two Degrees future energy scenario in [22];  
• average availability of nuclear plants is assumed to be 77% for older plants and 95% for the newer plants [23];  
• in the initial dispatch of each scenario, baseload power supply (met by nuclear) is first in the merit order; 
                                                     
3 In the studies presented in this report, the results of loss of load events are roughly equivalent to the results for the loss of infeed events, and as a 
result only loss of infeed events will be investigated. The main distinction between the two is the loss of demand sensitivity in a loss of load event 
that is absent in a loss of infeed event, however, at 2.5%/Hz this is equivalent to between 12.5 MW for a normal loss event at a 1 GW loss risk and 
36 MW for an infrequent loss event at a 1.8 GW loss risk. Since dynamic Secondary response is modelled as an extension of dynamic Primary 
response, the modelled service is the low frequency equivalent of dynamic High frequency response. All other dynamic services have symmetrical 
components, and static response services exist for both high and low frequency events. 
4 This differs from the chain of events simulated loss that was used to tune the model. 
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• if an inertia target is used then flexible synchronous generation is dispatched next in the merit order until the 
inertia (and power demand) target is reached, if all flexible synchronous generation has been used and the 
inertia target has not been reached, then inertia is increased by dispatching the remaining synchronous 
generation and, if required, additional inertia via synchronous compensation. If the inertia target has been 
reached but power demand isn’t balance then the shortfall is met by non-synchronous dispatch;  
• if instead a non-synchronous dispatch is the target, then non-synchronous power is dispatched next in the merit 
order until the target has been achieved, if the power demand has not been reached then flexible synchronous 
generation is dispatched next and, if required, inflexible synchronous generation is next in the merit order; and 
• when frequency response reserve is being optimised, each scenario is re-dispatched to allow for the provision 
of dynamic Primary and Secondary response via the flexible synchronous generator. However, this 
optimisation is constrained by the fixed baseload of minimum nuclear power supply, any defined minimum 





5 Assessing Future Frequency Response Services 
Scenarios based on inertia values, shown in Table 5.1, were derived using the swing equation [24], loss risks and the 
RoCoF limits. The distinction between embedded inertia and generation inertia is ignored in this study, and instead 
inertia values represent total system inertia. It is also important to note that all scenarios assume a demand of 30 GW, 
and RoCoF and load shedding schemes are deactivated. Static Primary and Secondary response are assumed to be 
available at 250 MW each, with the service definitions delivered as modelled in the tuned single bus model.  











1 200 Normal loss 
2 1.32 264 Infrequent Loss 
3 1.32 264 Normal loss 
4 1.8 360 Infrequent Loss 
5 
0.5 
1 50 Normal loss 
6 1.32 66 Infrequent Loss 
7 1.32 66 Normal loss 
8 1.8 90 Infrequent Loss 
9 
1 
1 25 Normal loss 
10 1.32 33 Infrequent Loss 
11 1.32 33 Normal loss 
12 1.8 45 Infrequent Loss 
Existing and proposed dynamic frequency response services are tested and compared using the scenarios in Table 5.1. 
The studies presented are for 60 second simulations to represent the window for compliance with the SQSS requirements 
presented in Table 2.1, as a result frequency containment is only valid for a simulation that reaches a new steady state 
at frequency greater than or equal to 49.5 Hz.  
As expected, it can be seen in Figure 5.1, that existing services are sufficient for frequency events when the power 
system is constrained within existing RoCoF limits. However, in Figure 5.2, it is observed that existing services are 
inadequate for normal loss risk frequency conditions as the power system tends towards 0.5 Hz/s RoCoF. Lastly, as the 
power system tends towards 1 Hz/s (in Figure 5.3), existing services become inadequate. This supports previous work, 
and indeed the direction of the industry; i.e. the increasing need for faster than traditional dynamic frequency response 




Figure 5.1: Frequency plots for both pairs of loss risks at 0.125 Hz/s RoCoF limit (Existing services). 
 
 




Figure 5.3: Frequency plots for both pairs of loss risks at 1 Hz/s RoCoF limit (Existing services). 
The GB ESO proposed a suite of dynamic frequency response services, designed to be improve on existing services. 
The performance of these services, as they are defined, can be considered by utilising the scenarios in Table 5.1; 
however, the 0.125 Hz/s scenarios can be ignored since existing services are sufficient and there is accelerated 
programme in place to update the settings of legacy RoCoF relays before 2025. 
 




Figure 5.5: Frequency plots for both pairs of loss risks at 1 Hz/s RoCoF limit (ESO draft proposal services). 
Comparing the plot for existing and proposed services (Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.4, and Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.5), it is 
evident that the services proposed by the ESO are a significant improvement to the existing services5, and while there 
is some oscillation when addressing a normal loss risks, there is also strong damping6. A key factor influencing the 
appearance of the oscillations in these simulations is how quickly the event needs to be contained in relation to the 
detection and activation delay of the frequency response services. In Figure 5.5, increasing the response reserve in 
scenarios 9 and 11 would also dramatically increase the oscillations observed, since the service isn’t acting quickly 
enough; i.e. the events must be contained within 0.5 s and the delay of the fastest service is 0.5 s. The dampened 
oscillations observed (e.g. Scenarios 5 and 7 in Figure 5.4 with a 1 s containment time and scenarios 9 and 11 in Figure 
5.5 with a 0.5 s containment time) indicate a starting point beyond which the risk of containment failure and frequency 
instability increases. Further study shows that the boundary occurs when frequency needs to be contained to within 0.5 
Hz of nominal 50 Hz frequency in less than 1.2 seconds, equivalent to 60 GVAs or 79.2 GVAs for a 1 GW or 1.32 GW 
normal loss risk, respectively. The data presented in the system operability framework (SOF) 2016 report indicates that 
across all four future energy scenarios the minimum inertia is about 70 GVAs across all four scenarios in 2025/26. This 
indicates that while it is unlikely for the boundary to occur for 1 GW normal loss risk, it can occur up to 1.3% of the 
year in 2025/267 for a 1.32 GW normal loss risk. Looking ahead to 2030 using data from Antares based on a European 
market dispatch in hourly resolutions for a high wind8 scenario (with wind displacing gas), it is observed that with the 
inclusion of embedded inertia (at the assumed inertia constant) it is unlikely that there would be an instance where the 
power system is dispatched at less than 60 GVAs of inertia. However, when embedded inertia is excluded the likelihood 
of the boundary occurring increases to about 16% of the year, as depicted in Figure 5.6. On the other hand, it is observed 
that with the inclusion of embedded inertia the power system is dispatched at less than 79.2 GVAs of inertia about 1% 
of the year, which increases to 22% of the year when embedded inertia is excluded. 
                                                     
5 When simulating the ESO’s proposed services, dynamic Primary response is replaced by Dynamic Regulation as it is defined with the worst-
case delivery of the service assumed, i.e. with a 2 second delay and 8 second delivery. 
6 It is acknowledged that improvements to the control strategy deployed could provide even stronger damping, but this does not represent a worst-
case scenario and therefore simplified active power controllers that do the minimum required to comply with the definition of the frequency 
response services are deployed in these studies. 
7 0.59% of the year in No Progression, 0.95% of the year in Slow Progression, 1.29% of the year in Gone Green and 1.32% of the year in Consumer 
Power. 
8 An average of 43.87% of non-synchronous generation across every hour of the year with an hourly minimum of 4.25% and maximum of 92.98%. 




Figure 5.6: Inertia dispatched in 2030 for a high wind penetration scenario based on market dispatch. 
It is reiterated that the defined boundary does not necessitate containment failure or instability, but rather it identifies 
a point beyond which the risk or one or both increases. The likelihood of this risk can be mitigated by improved control 
topologies9 (details of which fall beyond the scope of present work), they can also be remedied if the proposed services 
activate quicker than defined, or if a fast-acting frequency response service is defined. The value in the provision of 
fast-acting frequency response is in RoCoF containment, or more precisely in slowing down RoCoF until slower 
frequency response services can activate. A fast-acting response could be an inherent characteristic of the power system 
e.g. synchronous inertia, or it could be dispatchable reserve such as synthetic inertia (SI), or some other fast-acting 
frequency response product.  
5.1 Fast Acting Dispatchable Frequency Response Services 
A simplified synthetic inertia service is modelled to investigate the impact of the recovery period and fast-acting 
service on frequency containment. This synthetic inertia service is defined as a service that fully activates in 250 ms, 
sustains delivery for 1 s and recovers for 20 seconds without exceeding -5% of the active power response delivered, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.7.  
The subsequent plots show the results of studies conducted for scenarios 5, 6, 9 and 1010 using the ESO’s proposed 
services and 150 MW of synthetic inertia as it is defined in Figure 5.7. From Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 it can be seen 
that as the inertia reduces the positive impact of a synthetic inertia service increases, with the most dramatic 
improvement observed in scenario 9 of Figure 5.9. It is also observed that at the relatively higher inertia of 66 GVAs in 
scenario 6 (Figure 5.8), the recovery period of synthetic inertia has a detrimental impact on overall frequency 
containment. The results suggest the value of this sort of service, and while the recovery period could have a detrimental 
effect, constraints could be imposed to produce a service definition that minimises any detrimental impact on frequency 
containment, while maximising the benefits of the service.   
                                                     
9 E.g. improved damping could be used to reduce oscillations. 








Figure 5.8: The impact of 150 MW of synthetic inertia with a controlled recovery period on normal and loss risks for a 







Figure 5.9: The impact of 150 MW of synthetic inertia with a controlled recovery period on normal and loss risks for a 
1 Hz/s RoCoF limit. 
Although the deployment of 150 MW synthetic inertia, in addition to the proposed ESO services, was able to improve 
frequency containment in scenario 9 (see Figure 5.9), the service had only minimal impact on damping the oscillatory 
behaviour. Synthetic inertia is a fast-acting frequency response service and therefore capable of reducing the amplitude 
of the oscillation (as observed in the initial swing), however, since the service isn’t sustained and is only available for 1 
second the impact is restricted.  
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A hypothetical service called Improved Frequency Containment (IFC) illustrates impact of a fast-acting sustained 
service via the results presented in Figure 5.10. IFC is defined as a frequency response service with a deadband of 0.015 
Hz, and a 250 ms detection and activation delay. IFC is designed to fully deliver response up to 500 ms of the event, 
such that 100% of the response is delivered for a 0.5 Hz frequency deviation. This service is sustained for the duration 
of the simulation but it is also capable of deactivation. In this study a controller deactivation, when simulated, occurs 
after response has been sustained for 30 seconds at a rate no faster than 0.05 pu/s11. Figure 5.10 shows a comparison of 
the performance of frequency response services in scenario 9, where the ESO services refer to Dynamic Regulation, 
Dynamic Moderation and Dynamic Containment services. 
 
Figure 5.10: Modified versions of scenario 9 showing the performance of frequency response services for a normal 
loss event12. 
It is observed that in comparison to the ESO’s proposed future frequency response services alone (red line), the 
inclusion of the fast-acting services (SI and IFC) to the ESO’s services improves frequency containment in scenario 9, 
however, unlike SI (blue line), IFC (green line) exhibits strong damping when used alongside the ESO’s proposed 
services. When deployed alone, i.e. used as a frequency response service alongside only EFR and static responses, the 
IFC service (black line) is capable of containing the event and quickly damping out the initial overshoot13. 
                                                     
11 This ramp down rate also applies when the service reduces response delivered even if the minimum sustain time hasn’t elapsed. 
12 The services depicted in these plots are used alongside EFR and static response as they were originally dispatched in scenario 9. 






Figure 5.11: Comparing the performance of services using scenarios 9 and 10. 
 
In the comparisons done for using scenarios 9 and 10, the IFC-only simulations require less active power reserve to 
contain the event than the ESO’s proposed services; about 17% for the normal loss risk and about 26% for the infrequent 
loss risk. It is also observed from Figure 5.11 that when paired with the ESO’s proposed services, frequency behaviour 
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during a normal loss event is still acceptable when IFC deactivates after 30 seconds of response delivery, since the loss 
of IFC is balanced by other active services, but the impact of the deactivation is more dramatic in the infrequent loss 
event (scenario 10) than in normal loss event (scenario 9). It should be noted that when IFC is deployed as the sole (or 
major) dynamic response service, any deactivation would need to be balanced by a supplementary secondary service. 
Further work on the IFC service should consider a deactivation definition linked to Fast Reserve14, with a deactivation 
ramp down rate that is sufficiently defined to facilitate the handover of service requirements.  
5.2 System Non-Synchronous Penetration Limits 
At present, non-synchronous dispatch limits in the GB system are defined in terms of inertia, which is calculated via 
the swing equation [25]. In Ireland, the non-synchronous dispatch is managed using the System Non-Synchronous 
Penetration (SNSP) ratio [26]. The Irish system operator, EirGrid, has an operational policy that limits the proportion 
of demand that can be met at any one time from non-synchronous sources based on the SNSP, set in 2018 to 65% [27]. 
The SNSP limit is the SNSP ratio that if exceeded would lead to a breach of frequency and RoCoF limits, unless 
corrective actions are taken by the system operator. Equation (1) defines the SNSP ratio, where ‘Total Demand’ includes 
interconnector exports, and ‘NSG’ refers to non-synchronous generation. It should be noted that this metric makes 
assumptions on the inertia and frequency response dispatched in the power system. 





The scenarios presented in Table 5.1, for normal and infrequent loss risk events, has been adapted to facilitate the 
SNSP studies presented in this section. The 12 scenarios in Table 5.2 are used to investigate both the existing and future 
services proposed by the ESO. Instead of an inertia constraint, as is used in the previous studies, each scenario is 
dispatched for a given level of demand and non-synchronous power dispatched, so that a spread is achieved that included 
multiple demand levels with each level considering a range of non-synchronous power dispatch.  
 Table 5.2: Scenarios devised to investigate the impact of the services on non-synchronous penetration limits. 
Scenario RoCoF Limit (Hz/s) Loss Risk Limit (GW) Frequency Condition 
1 
0.125 
1 Normal loss 
2 1.32 Infrequent Loss 
3 1.32 Normal loss 
4 1.8 Infrequent Loss 
5 
0.5 
1 Normal loss 
6 1.32 Infrequent Loss 
7 1.32 Normal loss 
8 1.8 Infrequent Loss 
9 
1 
1 Normal loss 
10 1.32 Infrequent Loss 
11 1.32 Normal loss 
12 1.8 Infrequent Loss 
 
The study presented in this section is concerning the system non-synchronous penetration limits of the GB power 
system in 2025, where the following assumptions have been made:   
• the loss of infeed is simulated as an instantaneous loss of power supply such that frequency is contained within 
acceptable frequency conditions as detailed in  Table 2.1; 
• demand is modelled as total demand in the power system including exports; 
                                                     
14 Or a future service that replaces the functions of Fast Reserve. 
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• the distinction between embedded and generation inertia is ignored, and embedded inertia is not explicitly 
modelled; 
• the inherent frequency response of total system demand (demand sensitivity) is applied as 2.5%/Hz of total 
system demand;  
• dynamic response services are simulated as defined, with 227 MW of EFR dispatched;  
• static response services are simulated as applied in the tuned SBM model with a fixed availability of 250 MW 
each for Primary and Secondary static response; 
• the delivery of Primary response is simulated as applied in the tuned SBM model; 
• it is assumed that Primary response is delivered by gas and hydro plants in the FSG element of the model, and 
frequency is contained using the least response reserve holding as estimated by FEROS;  
• the flexible synchronous generator is modelled as 75% loaded with a 25% headroom for delivery of response;  
• generation background is based on the GB ESO’s Two Degrees future energy scenario in [22];  
• average availability of nuclear plants is assumed to be 77% for older plants and 95% for the newer plants [23];  
• in the initial dispatch of each scenario, baseload power supply (met by nuclear) is first in the merit order;  
• a non-synchronous dispatch is a defined constraint, so non-synchronous power is dispatched next in the merit 
order until the target has been achieved, if the power supply does not meet demand then flexible synchronous 
generation is dispatched next and, if required, inflexible synchronous generation is next in the merit order; and 
• when frequency response reserve is being optimised each scenario is re-dispatched to allow for the provision 
of Primary, Secondary and High frequency response via the flexible synchronous generator. However, this 
optimisation is constrained by: the amount of frequency response that the flexible synchronous generator must 
hold as reserve in the headroom; the fixed baseload of minimum nuclear power supply; the defined minimum 
non-synchronous penetration; and the available flexible synchronous generation background.  
Using these assumptions 24 scenarios were simulated (12 scenarios for existing frequency response services and 12 
for future frequency response services) for a demand and non-synchronous dispatch range of 20 – 70 GW. The results 
of this study are presented in Figure 5.12 to Figure 5.17, where the solid lines are trends for normal loss events, the 
broken lines are trends for infrequent loss events, the red lines are trends for the current normal and infrequent loss risk 
pair (1 GW and 1.32 GW), and the blue lines are trends for the future normal and infrequent loss risk pair (1.32 GW and 
1.8 GW). Considering these plots, it can be seen that there is little difference between the trends of the 0.5 Hz/s RoCoF 
limit and 1 Hz/s RoCoF limit, while there is a significant different between the 0.125 Hz/s RoCoF limit and the other 
two limits. A few factors limit the penetration of non-synchronous power dispatch including: minimum baseload power 
from nuclear plants; available energy responses and flexible synchronous plant; acceptable frequency conditions; and 
RoCoF limits.  
At the lower RoCoF limit of 0.125 Hz/s, the RoCoF limit is the dominant constraint across the trends, however, once 
this limit is relaxed the scenarios can be pushed to the maximum penetration of non-synchronous power dispatch, limited 
by the availability of frequency response reserve, minimum baseload power from nuclear power plants, and the 
capability of the scenario to contain the event within acceptable frequency conditions15. It should be noted that the 
oscillations previously observed are ignored as a constraint in these studies. It is recommended that while the system 
non-synchronous penetration (SNSP) trends produced in Figure 5.12 to Figure 5.17 consider frequency containment, 
further consideration should include the risk of frequency instabilities, as well as a broader representation of the range 
of factors influencing the likelihood of containment. That said, simplified mathematical relationships can be employed 
                                                     
15 It should be noted that 60 seconds as a fixed value was chosen for simplicity and while it does not reflect the total time available for acceptable 
behaviour for an infrequent frequency event, it is considered sufficient for the purposes of this study. 
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to determine the peaks and troughs that would likely be exhibited due to a given loss for a given dispatch of inertia and 
response (see [28]). 
 
Figure 5.12: Scenarios 1 – 4 for a 0.125 Hz/s RoCoF limit using existing frequency response services. 
 




Figure 5.14: Scenarios 9 – 12 for a 1 Hz/s RoCoF limit using existing frequency response services. 
 
 




Figure 5.16: Scenarios 5 – 8 for a 0.5 Hz/s RoCoF limit using ESO’s future frequency response services. 
 
 





6 Potential Technologies for the Provision of Response 
Traditionally synchronous generations have been the main source of energy responses to frequency disturbances, with 
all plants providing inertia and some plants also providing dynamic Primary, Secondary and High frequency response, 
and it is likely that synchronous plants would continue to participate in future frequency response services via products 
like Dynamic Regulation. Non-synchronous generators can and do participate in frequency response, however variable 
resource technologies such as wind and solar, require shorter tender horizons for higher predictability of power output, 
and the ESO has taken steps towards addressing this barrier to participation. Wind currently participates in dynamic 
Primary, Secondary and High frequency response via the MFR market, suggesting that the technology can accommodate 
a sustained response for 30 minutes (under the Secondary response definitions).  
The capability to provide fast and fast-acting response services gives non-synchronous technologies a favourable 
position in the provision of future frequency response services, particularly with the ESO’s proposed Dynamic 
Moderation and Dynamic Containment products. Based on the current participation in the MFR market, wind is 
technically capable of sustaining a response, to meet both Dynamic Moderation and Containment services, as they are 
currently defined16. However, a hybrid solution would better place the wind plant to deliver either service, potentially 
opening access to other ancillary products and improve power output certainty. Although the converter may be capable 
of responding quickly enough to meet the requirements for Dynamic Moderation and Dynamic Containment, there is 
the question of where the energy comes from; this gap can be met by deploying storage. 
6.1 Energy Storage 
Developments such as the EFR tender indicate that battery energy storage systems (BESS) are mature enough to 
participate as providers of a frequency response service, giving a strong indication as to their future potential as a viable 
technology for the delivery of future frequency response services.  
 
Figure 6.1: Development maturity of major electrical storage technologies towards large-scale deployment [29]. 
From Figure 6.1, the most likely technologies to provide grid scale services by 2025 would be one of the four in the 
‘deployed’ branch, where broadly speaking (to varying degrees) anyone of those technologies could deliver future 
frequency response services. These technologies are already deployed around the world and are thus viable for 
deployment for 2025. The benefits of different storage technologies are presented in Table 6.1, while Figure 6.2 shows 
a generalised chart on usage (see also [30] for summary of characteristics). Deploying energy storage as a hybrid solution 
would provide a useful place to store energy during curtailment and make energy available to respond to a frequency 
                                                     
16 It should be noted that EFR is comparable to Dynamic Containment (the future frequency response service that the ESO plans to introduce first). 
26 
 
events minimising ‘headroom’ requirements. That said, there are non-trivial additional costs associated particularly with 
installation, a cost-benefit analysis would be required to determine the commercial viability of the hybrid.  




Figure 6.2: Generalised comparison of discharge time and power rating for various energy storage technologies. (The 
comparisons are of a general nature because several of the technologies have broader power ratings and longer 
discharge times than illustrated) [29]. 
6.2 Synchronous Compensators 
Synchronous compensators (SCs) are inherently unloaded synchronous machines that is considered to have the 
potential to offer, among other benefits, a boost to system inertia and an increase to system fault level [32]. In [33], SCs 
are considered to have the potential to address RoCoF issues, regional stability, voltage management, and reduce the 
risk of loss of commutation in LCC HVDC links. It is an established technology, which could be purchased for purpose 
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or retrofitted by taking advantage of synchronous plants scheduled for decommissioning. The benefits of deploying 
synchronous compensators to the power system are widely known since they are synchronous machines. The ESO’s 
recent stability pathfinder [34] provided a route to market for the deployment of synchronous compensators (and the 
operation of existing synchronous generators in compensation mode). The results of the accepted tenders indicate that 
about 20% of the total 17 GVAs17 will be deployed by summer of this year, for contracts spanning almost 6 years – made 
up of one pumped storage plant and two CCGTs. The other accepted bids have a start date for March/April 2021 and 
while the technology type isn’t explicit in the tender results the ‘XXXX’ in the unit IDs could imply new builds and 
may include synchronous compensators. Operators of non-synchronous technologies can deploy synchronous 
compensators at their sites, providing access to the benefits of a ‘nearby’ synchronous machine, including inertia, 
improvement to power quality and overloading capability. 
6.3 Virtual Synchronous Machines  
A virtual synchronous machine (VSM) control algorithm is one that emulates the properties of traditional synchronous 
machines. There are different types of VSM and they can be classified based on the control algorithm employed and 
how the synchronous machine model is applied on the voltage source converter controllers [35].  In [36] the authors 
discuss a trial involving the use of VSMs in a wind park owned and operated by Scottish Power Renewables. The 23-
turbine, 69 MW Dersalloch park in Scotland (direct-drive full-converter) ran in grid-forming mode for approximately 6 
weeks and varied levels of inertial contributions were investigated. Key findings from the trials that will be summarised 
below. 
It was observed that when exposed to a small phase step (0.2-0.4 degrees) the VSM has a response similar to that of a 
synchronous machine, however, for large phase steps in excess of 5-10 degrees (depending on the pre-existing power 
output) additional intervention is required to avoid over-currents. On the 31st of May 2019 the IFA tripped and the GB 
power system experienced a loss of about 1 GW, with RoCoF peaking at about -0.11 Hz/s and a frequency drop of nearly 
0.5 Hz. At this time the wind farm was operating at a VSM setting of 4 seconds inertia constant, with a power output of 
about 50 MW of the 69 MW capacity. In this instance windspeed was falling, with power output falling at a rate of about 
200 kW/s, but during the study there was no evidence of a recovery period. It was observed that the windfarm ramped 
up to deliver roughly 1.2 MW, offering an additional 0.1% of the available GB system inertia. On the 12th of June 2019 
a similar event occurred with IFA resulting in a peak RoCoF of about -0.08 Hz/s and a frequency drop of about 0.35 Hz, 
however, this time the windfarm was configured with VSM inertia setting of 7.5 seconds. In comparison to the previous 
event, it is found that although the RoCoF is smaller the response is larger as a result of the larger inertia constant. 
However, the dropping background windspeed acts to counter some of the response (see Fig. 3 in Figure 6.3). In both 
events, it is shown that the VSM, being inertia based, reduces power as RoCoF becomes positive during network 
recovery. On the 20th of June 2019 another event occurred (the cause is not described) resulting in a peak RoCoF of 
about -0.06 Hz/s and a frequency drop of -0.4 Hz. In this instance wind speed is increasing, on average, across the wind 
farm – the windfarm performed as expected and delivered an active power response.  
In addition to these actual events a third event is simulated, with a RoCoF of -1 Hz/s and a frequency drop of 3 Hz, 
while the VSM inertia constant is configured to 8 seconds. The main take away from this test was that there limits to 
what can be achieved with a wind turbine, even with VSMs, without additional energy storage or pre-event curtailment. 
In addition, operating at high inertia values without additional energy stored besides the rotor can be counterproductive. 
In an attempt to deliver a peak response of about 1 MW each, the reducing rotor speeds of the turbines being simulated 
caused the controllers to reduce the reference power and in turn reduce the absolute power infeed as the event unfolded; 
this is a ‘recovery period’ during which power output is reduced until rotor speed recovers. The authors highlight that 
one of the turbines had its rotor speed fall so low that the turbine cut-out. Aside from additional storage, curtailment and 
submaximal power tracking, the authors also suggest the inclusion of the capability to alter the VSMs inertia constant 
in real-time, so that the inertia constant can be high at appropriate wind and rotor speeds, and a tapered reduction when 
wind and rotor speeds are lower. It should be noted that the turbine’s ability to respond is extremely small when the 
turbines are operating at very low or zero power. Furthermore, the application of a VSM controller is not exclusive to 
wind farms, the algorithms can be applied other power electronic devices such as batteries as investigated in [37]. 
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